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• Introduction
In this issue, Indret analyzes, in three different ways, 113 rulings handed down by the First
Chamber of the Supreme Court with regard to defamation, privacy and freedom of speech:
a) to show how the excessive number of trivial cases that come to the attention of the
Supreme Court for cassation, or to that of the Constitutional Court for constitutional
protection (amparo, protection against violation of Bill of Rights included in Spanish
Constitution) could be limited with relatively simple modifications to the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil (code of civil procedure) and the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (basic
laws and statutes governing the operation of the judiciary) and the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal
Constitucional (basic laws and statutes governing the operation of the Constitutional Court);
b) to tackle the long-standing question raised by the existence of two Supreme Courts in
Spain (as also occurs in other culturally close countries); and, finally, c) to select for readers
the cases that are seen as most relevant within the period under consideration. In a second
installment, InDret will analyze two particularly noteworthy rulings within this
constellation of cases, the SSTS, 1st, 2.6.2000, Enrique Rodríguez Galindo v. Fermín Muguruza
and others, and 8.3.1999, Carlos Trías Bertran’s children v. the “Corporació Catalana de Radio i
Televisió” and others. These cases make clear the difficulty of applying constitutional
principles on freedom of speech to situations of civil conflict.
• “De minimis non curat Iudex”: a body of case law plagued by trivial cases
In addition to the cases to be reviewed in the second part of this paper and some others
whose legal relevance for a democratic state cannot be disputed, in the 1998-2000 period,
the First Chamber has been flooded with dozens of trivial cases that lack any interest from
the point of view of cassation.
It is, for example, worth raising the question of whether the following actions merit being
judged by the Court of Cassation:
− Publishing remarks referring to the chairman of a savings bank, which included expressions such as
“playing all the angles”, “self-interested manipulator” or “financial emperor” (STS 26.2.2000: 0 €
compensation).
− That a journalist wrote of a colleague using the expressions “pathetic libel monger”, “the foolishness
of an overgrown child with very bad taste” and “physically and mentally underdeveloped” (STS
18.10.1999: 3,005.06 €.
− Referring to the plaintiff as “alias Colombo” (STS 13.6.2000: 0 €), alluding to a fictional character who
had a glass eye.
− Having described the plaintiff or plaintiffs as “thief!” (STS 14.4.2000: 6,010.12 €), “good-for-nothing!”
(STS 11.10.2000: 901.52 €), “a shameless gang” (STS 12.5.2000: 0 €), “straight from the toilet (...)
pestilent stench (...), “feces that you make us expel” (STS 30.11.1998: 6.010,12 €).
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− Having said of two ill-fated athletes that “one turned out to be a slacker and the other got mixed up
with drugs” (STS 27.3.1998: compensation awarded for the second remark, 1,502.53 €).
− Having described as an “enigma” the manner in which the plaintiff’s deceased brother, a priest, had
increased his fortune (STS 26.1.1998: 0 €).
− Or, finally, having made obvious errors of transcription when, in a letter of apology, “May I ruin
(desgraciar) Don León?” was written instead of “May I make amends to (desagraviar) Don León?” (STS
27.6.2000: 0 €), in a context that made it clear that this was an error.
Like the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court is also being asphyxiated by an overload
of trivial cases. During the three-year period under consideration, the Constitutional Court
has had to resolve many cases that could easily have been settled by the regular Courts
without any need whatsoever for the Constitutional Court to reaffirm principles that were
already well established. The Court has had to apply these principles to simple cases that
did not require changes to or the creation of new constitutional case law, and, therefore,
which should not have come to the attention of this body.
It is doubtful whether the following should be judged in the context of constitutional
protection (amparo):
− A media publication, its director and a journalist published references to the plaintiff, a member of the
Spanish diplomatic delegation to Holland, stating that he had been involved in trafficking in arms,
automobiles and drugs, as well as being linked to the terrorist group ETA (STC, 1st, 144/1998, April
30, 1998: the constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the Spanish magazine “Interviu”, the author
of the report and the publisher, “Ediciones Zeta, S.A.”, was denied).
− That a client should say of his lawyers that they "intended to charge him fees (…) contrary to what
had been agreed prior to the trial (…) greater than the compensation received (…), which the
Provincial Court had definitively (sic) set in appeal (…)” (STC, 2nd, 232/1998, December 1, 1998:
constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the two lawyers was denied).
− That a lawyer should say of a senior judge that “this writ is a real mess. It clearly fails to conform to
what a piece of legal text should be, and to include the minimal terms that a decision must contain. It
demonstrates a serious lack of knowledge of the law (…). Citizens should not have to tolerate judges
with a faulty knowledge of the law (…) This lady’s vocation for passing rulings is to be admired. I
can’t understand her insistence on working in a field of which she knows nothing” (STC, 2nd, 46/1998,
March 2, 1998: constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the author of the remarks was denied).
− Journalists and a media publication that published a report entitled “Socialist Falcon Crest: a shady
story of love, power and money”, in which it was said of the plaintiff that “Along the way, Angela got
pregnant by [Alfonso] Guerra’s secretary (…), that was a party”, “Fali didn’t want to marry Angela
and disappeared from the family scene” (STC, 1ª, 112/2000, May 5, 2000: request for constitutional
protection (amparo) by the director of the Spanish magazine Época, the author of the article and the
publisher, “Difusora de Información Periódica,SA”, was denied).
− Reporters and a media publication that had reproduced the image of the plaintiff’s bar in a report on
“hostess bars” (where prostitutes offer their services), in which the arrest of several businessmen was
reported (STC, 2nd, 77/1999, April 26, 1999: constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the director,
the editor and a Spanish magazine “Cambio 16” writer was denied).
− A property administrator who had offered his services to eleven property owners’ groups, sending
them various written documents in which he encouraged them to discontinue using the services of
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their administrator: “Current account interest should be paid to the property owners’ group. This also
applies to commissions and discounts that are often obtained from suppliers. The client, in both cases,
is the property owners’ group, not the administrator” (STC, 2ª, 180/1999, October 11, 1999:
constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the administrator of the eleven property owners’ groups
was denied).
− The reporters and the media publication that had published statements made by the biological mother
of the son of Sara Montiel: “Zeus’s natural mother speaks: I’ll never take my son away from Sara
Montiel”, together with the information that the biological mother had worked as a prostitute, and
that the son, at that time a minor, had been sold to his adoptive parents (STC, 1st, 134/1999, July 15,
1999: constitutional protection (amparo) sought by the publisher of the magazine, “Publicaciones Heres,
S.A.”, was denied).
− Finally, in a case of conviction for a public health offence, in which the applicant for constitutional
protection (amparo) had alleged violation of the right to privacy in telephone communications, when
the evidence obtained by this means was not considered in the decision to convict (STC, Plenary
meeting, 81/1998, April 2, 1998: constitutional protection denied).
What is questionable in these cases is not whether or not those involved deserved judicial
protection: without doubt, all of them did. What really raises serious concerns is the fact
that it is still seen as necessary to establish constitutional principles to resolve cases such as
those cited, the majority of which readily fit the terms of established constitutional
principles and should have been easily dealt with within that framework. The triviality
arises from the number of, for the most part, easily resolved cases that can be listed. This
function of the Court has grown out of control because there are two bodies that have
competence to exercise it – and not just one. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has no
filtering mechanism to determine which cases merit re-examination, and the Constitutional
Court lacks clearly defined competences for the selection of the cases which it must later
resolve.
The Constitutional Court extends constitutional protection (amparo) in few of the cases that come
to its attention. For instance, constitutional protection (amparo) was extended to one of the
journalists who had published of José María Ruiz Mateos and Misericordia Miarnau Salvat, wife
of José María Sabater, “Ruiz Mateos and his girlfriend spend 4 days in Jamaica,” “intimate female
friend”, “a grotesque episode with virgins, sex and currency dealing”, “the Virgin switched
sides”, “to run off with the wife of one’s Secretary, even if the lady is called Misericordia
(mercy)”. The journalist had been charged with slander by the Supreme Court (STC, 2nd,
200/1998, October 14, 1998). The Court acted in the same manner in a case in which the Provincial
Court of Murcia had charged the appellant as the perpetrator of an act of contempt for having
stated of a senator and mayor, “Oh, Juanico – you’ll throw in your cards with anyone now!”, “so
there’s more land zoned for development for Promosa (a developer) or pro-fucking-whatever”,
“so the birds – who no doubt are left wing – can screw themselves”, “and if you want more, then
you’ll damn well get it” (STC, 1ª, 112/2000, May 5, 2000).
Our view that the cases outlined are trivial finds confirmation in the court decisions that
quantify damages in monetary terms. We have complete information about the amounts
sought in the suit and those finally awarded or validated in 43 of the 113 cases resolved by
the First Chamber of the Supreme Court in the three-year period being considered. The
arithmetic mean of the compensation finally collected by complainants is 25,947.23 €.
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However, for the sample analyzed, there is a great deal of variation around the mean. In a
few cases the Supreme Court awards or validates an amount of compensation far higher
than this mean, and in many others compensation for complainants is much less than the
indicated mean. There exists, therefore, a great dispersion around the mean (50,181.88 €), as
a result of which, it becomes an unrepresentative figure.
The dispersion is a result of the extensive margin of discretion our procedural system gives to
those making judgment in the determination of compensation. The uncertainty surrounding
compensation leads to the inflation of damages claimed in the suit and the fact that different
quantities are awarded in analogous cases makes it impossible for potential complainants to
calculate ex ante the benefits of the process (see in InDret, Efectos de la variabilidad sobre la resolución
de conflictos – Effects of variability on the resolution of conflicts).
The median provides more reliable information. The median is a figure which resists
movement away from the center, and, therefore, is little influenced by the existence of
extreme values. For the cases analyzed, the median is 15,025.3 €, astonishingly low if
compared to the median of compensation sought by the complainants in their suits:
150,253.02 €.
The fact that the Supreme Court must deal with so many matters, and the general lack of
interest of these matters from the perspective of cassation can be explained by the existence
of a procedural system that has historically placed a higher priority on lawsuits having
access to cassation than on breach of the fundamental rights of art. 18.1 CE (article 18.1 of
the Spanish Constitution).
Before Ley 1/2000, de 7 de enero, de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC, a code of civil procedure)
entered into force on the 8th of January, 2001, civil jurisdiction for protection against defamation
and invasion of privacy, fundamental rights included in art. 18.1 CE, could be exercised through:
i) The corresponding trial according to the quantity of the suit (arts. 481 y ss. R. D.
de 3 de febrero de 1881, de promulgación de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil -
LEC 1881-).
ii) The brief and preferential special procedure established in Ley 62/1978, de 26
de diciembre, de protección jurisdiccional de los derechos fundamentales de la
persona (Ley 62/1978, a law addressing jurisdictional protection of
fundamental rights). The Disposición Transitoria Segunda de la Ley Orgánica
1/1982, de 5 de mayo, de protección civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad
personal y familiar y a la propia imagen (LO 1/1982, a temporary provision for
civil protection against defamation and invasion of privacy). This provision
included these rights in the catalogue of fundamental rights, the violation of
which allowed recourse to the special procedure.
Within the terms of this regulation, any breach of fundamental rights recognized in art. 18.1 CE
and dealt with through the civil procedure outlined in Law 62/1978, could accede to cassation
based on the nature of the case and regardless of the quantity of the suit:
Art. 15.2 Ley 62/1978: “A recourse to cassation, or, where appropriate, to revision can be brought
against the ruling made in appeal”.
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Art. 1687.4 LEC 1881: “The following can be subject to cassation: (...) 4. The decisions for which it
is expressly allowed in the circumstances defined and subject to the requirements that have been
established”.
LEC 2000 repealed arts. 11-15 Ley 62/1978, which concerned the civil protection of
fundamental rights (Disposición Derogatoria Única, 2. 3º LEC, the repeal provision referred
to). Consequently, petitions for jurisdictional protection of fundamental rights are now
dealt with through ordinary declarative procedure, except in cases which involve the right
to rectification (art. 249. 2º LEC).
In the final analysis, though, the effect of the reform has been limited: the terms
determining access to cassation are still so broad that any suit involving the right to
freedom of injury to honor, banal as it may be, can accede to the Supreme Court. In effect,
in accordance with art. 477.2 LEC:
“Rulings made on appeal by Provincial Courts can be subject to cassation in the
following cases:
1. When they are made in accordance with principles of civil judicial protection of
fundamental rights, with the exception of those recognized in article 24 of the
Constitution”.
The criterion established in the regulation is not reasonable: it contributes significantly (we
calculate 3%) to the collapse of civil cassation, now inundated with a backlog of 10,000
cases. In the three-year period being examined, an average of more than four years passed
between the issuing of a ruling and the cassation hearing sought. Justice delayed is justice
denied.
It is the view of InDret that solutions to this problem exist. For example, in cases in which
recourse to cassation is not possible, one measure that could be taken would be to impute
to the Civil and Criminal Chambers of the High Courts of Justice knowledge of the
grounds for cassation for normal protection (amparo) against rulings made on appeal. In
cases in which recourse to cassation is possible, it might be possible to create a special
chamber within the Supreme Court (“Chamber of Protection”-amparo-) with the objective of
holding hearings on violations of fundamental rights by jurisdictional bodies. In this
manner, the High Courts of Justice would generally be the last recourse for ordinary
protection (amparo). Cases would only reach the Supreme Court if they met the criteria
which made recourse to cassation possible. The reduction in the workload could be even
greater if, along the lines of other legislative proposals that are currently receiving a
positive response, access to cassation was restricted in such a way that the process focused
exclusively on ensuring the uniform application of the law and the establishment of
applied case law (see Pascual SALA SÁNCHEZ, 1994, p. 170).
In 2001, the Government and the Ministry of Justice have pursued a political and legislative
process to reform the Spanish justice system. Some of the proposals being debated in this process
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of change suggest reducing the workload of the Supreme Court by having the High Courts of
Justice hear the cases which they are competent to deal with. This would not imply any
diminishment of effective judicial protection if the process of cassation recovered and limited
itself to its original functions: ensuring that the law is interpreted correctly, and the creation of
applied case law.
The proposal made above and other similar ones could contribute to the resolution of
problems associated with ordinary judicial protection (amparo). Nevertheless, they do not
resolve the questions raised in relation to constitutional protection (amparo). Neither do
proposals of this type deal with the important issue of establishing substantive criteria to
distinguish one from the other. This is the matter that we will now address.
• Duplication of functions: two Supreme Courts. Isabel Preysler v. Hymsa
and others: STS, 1st, 31.12.1996; STC, 2nd, 115/2000, May 5, 2000; STS, 1st,
20.7.2000; STC, 2nd, 186/2001, September 17, 2001.
In effect, in addition to ordinary protection (amparo), the responsibility of the ordinary
Courts, our system also includes a provision for constitutional protection (amparo), the
responsibility of the Constitutional Court. As article 53.2 CE states in its opening
paragraph:
“All citizens are entitled to seek protection of the liberties and rights recognized in
article 14 and the first section of the second chapter in the ordinary Courts through
a procedure based on the principles of preference and brevity, and, where
appropriate, through recourse for protection (amparo) before the Constitutional
Court. The latter recourse will be applicable to conscientious objection recognized
in article 30”.
This duality is explained by the coexistence in many continental European States of a
Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court.
In the countries of the south of Europe, the Supreme Courts are the final arbiters in questions of
cassation. In other words, they ensure that laws are applied correctly and unify applied case law,
but they do not generally address, at least explicitly, declarations of demonstrated facts made by
those Courts. In practice, the distinction between fact and law in cassation is often a matter of
form, particularly when rulings are reviewed not to ensure the correct interpretation of the law or
for the unification of applied case law, but in response to the demands of material justice in a
specific case. In contrast, in some countries in the north of Europe (Germany is an example worth
noting) the Supreme Court is clearly a Court of revision, and can hear questions of fact.
The Spanish Constitution (1978) established constitutional jurisdiction independent of the
judiciary, following the principles applied in post-war Germany and Italy for similar specific
reasons (distrust of a generation of judges and magistrates who had applied laws passed by a
dictatorial regime and incompatible with the legislation of a liberal democratic state). Similar
generic reasons were also behind the system adopted (skepticism about a judicature made up of
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career civil servants intent on defending their interests; preference for a concentrated
constitutional jurisdiction – not diffuse – and for one exercised by magistrates selected by the
highest powers in the state).
As is to be expected, the duality of the Courts and competence over protection (amparo)
means that contradictory decisions are possible for the same case, and, historically,
comparative law shows that the duality of case law does periodically lead to an attempt by
one of the Courts to impose its own interpretation at the expense of one made by the other
(see Rosario SERRA CRISTÓBAL, 1999, passim).
The problem comes most clearly into focus precisely in the matter of protection (amparo)
because “in matters of constitutional protection (amparo) against jurisdictional acts, the
Constitutional Court acts as if it were a court of cassation” and “it is difficult not to find a
point of contact between any juridical question that is being debated in a legal process and
a fundamental right” (Rosario SERRA CRISTÓBAL, 1999, pp. 68-69).
During the three-year period that this paper is concerned with, both Courts heard the same
case four times, and, on each occasion reached different and conflicting decisions: when the
STS, 1st, 31.12.1996 (Isabel Preysler v. Hymsa and others) was reversed by STC, 2nd,
115/2000, May 5, 2000 (Isabel Preysler v. STS, 1st, 31.12.1996), the conflict between the two
Courts arose once again.
The weekly Spanish magazine Lecturas had published, beginning in issue 1942 (23.6.1989), a
series of ten installments entitled “The secret face of Isabel Preysler” (the plaintiff in the
suit). The first installment offered various statements about Ms. Preysler, a celebrity, made
by María Alejandra M.S., a former nanny of a daughter of the plaintiff: “the pimples that
often appear on her face…”, she uses “a particular crocodile skin diary”; along with
references to dermatological problems, the negative effects of a pregnancy on her beauty,
her reading habits, her wardrobe (including mention of certain items used in privacy), the
family routines; her relationships with ex-husbands, her current spouse and her parents;
and, a great deal about the lives of her children.
The plaintiff filed a suit against her former employee; against Mr. Julio B.G., director of the
weekly; against Mr. Enrique S. Ll., journalist; and against “El Hogar y la moda, S.A.”
(“Hymsa”), publisher of “Lecturas”, for breach of the right to personal and family privacy
(art. 18.1 CE) and asked for 300,506.05 € in compensation, among other measures. JPI 32 of
Barcelona, in a ruling made on 23.5.1991, awarded damages for part of the value of the suit,
ordering the defendants to jointly pay the plaintiff 30,050.61 €, among other
pronouncements. The Provincial Court of Barcelona, Section 11, made a ruling on 12.1.1993.
denying appeals made by the defendants with the exception of Enrique S. Ll., who was
absolved. The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed, and the SJPI (ruling) was partially revoked,
only in that the amount of compensation was increased to 60,101.21 €.
The STS, 1st, 31.12.1996 allowed the appeal for recourse to cassation made by “Hymsa” and
the director of the weekly, who alleged the breach of articles 20.1.d) CE in relation with art.
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18.1 CE and arts. 2.1 and 7.3 LO 1/1982. The ruling was revoked and the appellants were
absolved.
In the Fundamental Point of Law 1, the Supreme Court said:
“[T]he sentences that appeared in the magazine report (…) cannot be classified, by
any measure, as serious offences against privacy, though they may be an affront,
annoying, or simply unworthy from the perspective of social equality. They simply
constitute a spreading of gossip of little importance. Comments of this type may in
some cases justify the termination of an employment contract for service in the
home, but they should never be accepted as a serious offence or prejudicial to a
person’s privacy”.
The plaintiff appealed for the protection (amparo) of the Constitutional Court on the basis of
a breach of her constitutional right to personal and family privacy (art. 18.1 CE) and of the
principle of equality in the application of the law (art. 14 CE). STC, 1st, 115/2000, 5 May,
granted the protection (amparo) sought, declared that the appellant’s right to personal and
family privacy had been violated, and annulled the appeal ruling:
“[T]he statements in the [report], by publicly communicating information and
circumstances of a private nature, have illegitimately invaded the sphere of
personal and family privacy of the appellant” (F. D. 5th).
“[T]he observance of the duty to maintain secrets [professional, on the part of the
worker] is a guarantee that information about the personal and family sphere of the
householder will not be divulged. Divulgence of this kind of information
constitutes a breach of the trust that made it possible to obtain this information” (F.
D. 6th).
“[A] simple reading of the report is enough (…) to see that the information
divulged lacked any public relevance: Details related refer to (…) various private
aspects of the appellant’s personal and family life – from her supposed or real
physical defects and her efforts to lessen them or to avoid having them become
known, to an exhaustively detailed description of her home and of the family
members living with her” (F. D. 10th).
However, less than three months later, on 20.7.2000, the First Chamber of the Supreme
Court made a new ruling based on art. 5.1 Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder
Judicial (LOPJ, laws and statutes governing the judiciary). The new ruling replaced that
which had been annulled by the Constitutional Court, and declared invalid the motives for
the original appeal for cassation, which referred to the conflict between freedom of
information and the right to privacy. The Court then proceeded to reduce compensation to
an amount 400 times less than that conceded by the Provincial Court:
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“The sentences [in the report] can be described as insignificant given the extent to
which the affected party leads a public life – a fact which is well known.
Accordingly, the valuation of moral damages incurred can be set at 150 €” (F. D.
2nd).
The second ruling made by the Supreme Court was appealed for protection (amparo) by the
plaintiff, now alleging also right to privacy (18 CE) and due process of law (24.1 CE), for
incorrect application of STC 115/2000, and the Constitutional Court granted again the
protection, STC, 2ª, 186/2001, de 17 de septiembre (Isabel Preysler c. STS, 1ª, 20.7.2000): in
his decission, declared that the appellant’s right to personal and family privacy had been
violated, annulled the appeal ruling of Supreme Court of July 20, 2000, and awarded the
plaintiff with 60.101,21 €.
“The appellate opinion omits some essentials data affirmed in our STC 115/2000
(...); Neither considered basic parameters legally necessaries referred to other
violations of personal rights aspects of the plaintiff (…), without considering the
diffusion of the magazine in which the report was published (F.J. 5).
In this case, our decision implies to overrule the Supreme Court Decision [art. 55.1
a) LOTC]. But we can not limit to return the case back to the Supreme Court for a
new decision, because i) we are before a defect in iudicando and ii) the Supreme
Court has decided twice in this case (...). In order to reestablish the violated
personal right and not delay the final decision of this case, we overrule the
Supreme Court Decision of July, 20, 2000 and affirm the opinion of the Court of
Appeals of Barcelona, January 12, 1993” (F.J. 9).
It could be worst: two Constitutional Court Justices Muñoz issued a dissenting opinion in
which they proposed return the case back to the Supreme Court, once more. InDret and the
taxpayers still hope that one day they will no longer have to bear the costs of this recurring
institutional conflict.
In Spanish constitutional case law concerned with freedom of speech (art. 20 CE), the conflict
between the judiciary and the Constitutional Court has a long history, as has been discussed in
other papers. The conflict arose for the first time on the occasion of STC, 2nd, 104/1986, July 17,
1986, issued by Magistrate Francisco Tomás-Valiente. On that occasion, the journalist who sought
constitutional protection (amparo) had been charged with slander for remarks in a local weekly
(“Soria Semanal”, 14.4.1984) criticizing certain aspects of the management of urban development
by the local mayor. The Constitutional Court granted the appellant protection (amparo), but when
the case was sent back to the Court in Soria and the decision of the Constitutional Court was
known, the judge in Soria recognized that he must make a new ruling and, unperturbed, on
15.12.1986 reiterated the original decision. The journalist who had been charged appealed once
again for protection (amparo) and in STC, 2nd, 159/1987, October 26, 1987, it was granted: the
ruling stated that a judge can interpret the content of a ruling of constitutional protection, but
“he/she cannot contradict its terms or issue decisions that diminish the subjective legal status
declared therein (…). It is unacceptable (…) that after a ruling charging a criminal offence has
been annulled for intrinsic faults in the reasoning it expounds, the same judicial body should
reach a decision, reiterating in this manner the exercise of ius puniendi of the State” (F. D. 3rd).
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There were some loose ends: The majority ruling was opposed by Magistrate Eugenio Díaz Eimil
(“The new ruling made by the judge does not imply that ius puniendi is being exercised twice (…),
nor does it violate the principle of non bis in idem because the annulment of the first [ruling]
means that it loses any legal effect”).
Though it is beyond the scope of this brief review to examine them at length, similar situations
arise with a certain regularity. See, for example, STC, 1st, 7/1994, January 17, 1994, which
annulled STS, 1st, 30.4.1992, which in turn had revoked in cassation a ruling of the Provincial
Court (SAP), Madrid, 26.2.1990, according to which the refusal of the defendant to subject himself
to paternity tests constituted substantial evidence for the Court in demonstrating that the
defendant was the father of the son who had taken action to claim filiation.
The prevalence of constitutional case law over ordinary case law established by the
Supreme Court through cassation is based on art. 164.1 CE:
“The rulings of the Constitutional Court will be published in the Official State
Bulletin. If there are dissenting votes, they will also be included. Rulings have the
value of res judicata from the day following their publication, and no further
recourse against them is allowable. Those which declare unconstitutional a law, or a
regulation with force of law, and all those which are not limited to a subjective
evaluation of a right, have full effect before all others”.
Similarly, in art. 5.1. LOPJ:
“The Constitution has precedence within the legal system. It is the link binding all
judges and courts, who will interpret and apply laws and regulations according to
constitutional precepts and principles, and in a manner which conforms with the
interpretation of these articulated in the decisions issued by the Constitutional
Court in processes of all types”.
Nevertheless, arts. 54 y 55.1 Ley Orgánica 2/1979, de 3 de octubre, del Tribunal
Constitucional (LOTC, laws and statutes governing the operation of the Constitutional
Court) make matters more complicated. The first article seems to strictly limit the function
of constitutional protection (amparo):
“When the Chamber hears an appeal for protection (amparo) with respect to the
decisions of judges and courts, its function will be limited to specifying whether
rights or liberties have been violated. The Chamber will not consider any other
matter with regard to the actions of jurisdictional bodies”.
According to the second article, the role is not as strictly limited:
“The ruling that grants protection (amparo) will contain one or more of the
following pronouncements:
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a) The annulment of the decision, order or resolution that has impeded the full
exercise of protected rights and liberties, with determination, where
appropriate, of the extent of its effects.
b) Recognition of the right or public liberty, in conformance with its
constitutionally stated content.
c) Restoration of the appellant to the full possession of his right or liberty, with the
adoption of appropriate measures, where appropriate, for the conservation of
that right or liberty”.
Constitutional case law, from the initial position recognizing the prevalence of
constitutional protection (amparo), has quickly incorporated limitations in response to an
extrajudicial appeal for self-restraint on the part of the Constitutional Court. This is not
surprising: The conflict is not a legal one, but one which is intrinsically political. In fact, a
comparison of different solutions makes the extrajudicial nature of the conflict apparent.
Solutions consist of formulas (made explicit to varying degrees) that introduce an element
of self-restraint, and come from outside of the legal sphere, and outside of the sphere of
case law. This is the case for the “Constitutional Diplomacy” of Germany, the so-called
“Peace of the Wise” in Italy, Belgian “Constitutional Prudence”, etc. (Rosario SERRA
CRISTÓBAL, 1999, pp. 77-83).
There are a plethora of doctrines concerned with Constitutional interpretation and with
statutory construction that are normative; they indicate how the relevant sections should be
interpreted; subjective and objective doctrines; those which give precedence to
interpretation in accordance with certain principles and values, and those which give
preference to interpretations coming from specific bodies. It is the view of Indret that these
doctrines do not shed light on the nature and probable evolution of conflicts in this area:
legal doctrines concerned with the interpretation of laws are normative; they indicate how
statements of law should be interpreted. They are not positive theories that make it
possible to explain or predict factually possible interpretations. This is particularly true
when the conflict, as in the case we are examining, is one that is essentially political,
between institutions that share power and compete for it within the state. It seems
reasonable to put aside for a moment the normative doctrines and turn to the analytic
models of positive political science (Positive Political Theory: see Ken SHEPSLE/Mark
BONCHEK, 1997). These models are concerned with the interpretation of laws and make
explanation of this phenomenon possible. Some show how the limits of the possible
interpretations made by the Courts are set by the probability of reaction by other State
players and not by the terms of the Law. In other words, limits are not set in the usual
sense by possible meanings of the Constitutional or statutory sections which are being
interpreted, as is maintained by the dominant legal scholarship on the Constitutional
interpretation and statutory construction (Brian A. MARKS, 1988; John A.
FEREJOHN/Richard R. WEINGAST, 1992, pp. 263 ff, and 1992, pp. 565 ff; Pablo SALVADOR
CODERCH, 1992; MCNOLLGAST, 1995, págs. 1631-1683; and, recently, Robert D. COOTER,
2000, pp. 215 ff).
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Readers interested in these models can consult the works referred to, or the following brief
summary:
Assume a perfect bicameral legislative system, composed of a lower chamber based on
popular representation, and an upper chamber (senate) based on territorial
representation. Neither members of the house of commons nor senators are subject to
strict party discipline in voting. The judiciary is independent, and the judges, J, of which
it is made up, cannot be removed from their posts, serve life terms, and retire with full
salaries.
Suppose that a judge is called upon to rule on a case and can decide among various
interpretations of the law, which occupy a one-dimensional political space X, and that
within that space:
The historical political decision on the matter under consideration, Q – the status quo –
incorporates the substance of a prior legislative decision: Q translates in legislative terms
the preferences of legislators.
At present, the political positions of the members of the two chambers that occupy the
median position in each are, respectively, H and S.
This requires some clarification: If all data are ordered by magnitude, the median is the
value for which exactly half the values are less, and the other half greater. The median is
the central value of the distribution. So, a member of the house of commons or a senator
with complete freedom of vote occupies the median position when, in relation to a
question about which a decision must be made, he takes a political position that leaves as
many members of the house of commons or senators at his left as it does at his right.
Knowing where the median legislator is positioned in the political space is obviously
important in that it serves as a line of demarcation that indicates when to pause before
politically leaning to one side or the other on a decision.
X       _________K´_________H_________Q_________K_________S_________
Assume then that a judge decides a case adopting a resolution, K, in the H-S range. K
displeases the majority of senators, as it is to the left of the median senator, S. But neither
does it please the majority of members of the house of commons, as it is to the right of the
median member of the house of commons, H. Nevertheless, it is clear that K will not
provoke any counter-reaction on the part of legislators; it can become part of a stable
body of case law: Either of the two chambers would reject a proposal by the other to
suppress the precedent created by K, in favor of a more conservative legal decision (the
preference of the majority in the upper chamber), or a more progressive one (the
preference of the majority in the lower chamber). There will be no agreement on the
direction of change and K will stabilize as a new judicial interpretation of the legislation.
In contrast, note what would occur if the judge in question had decided to adopt the
position K´: K´ is a very progressive position situated to the left of the preferred position
of the median member of the house of commons, H, and that of the median senator, S –
outside of the H-S range. In this case it is clear that the two chambers would be in
concordance in their reactions, and that a new law would be passed to explicitly
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counteract the case law precedent set by K´.
When the interpretations in conflict are those of legislators and the Constitutional Court,
the model is similar, but the key legislator is not the median one, but the one that
occupies the decisive position in the relevant majority required to modify the
constitutional text (cf. art. 167 CE: 3/5 majority in both chambers, with subsequent
conditions). In Spain, however, the matter is further complicated by various factors,
notably i) the fact that members of the house of commons and senators are subject to
strict party discipline, and ii) the fact that political parties play a decisive role in the
appointment of the twelve members of the Constitutional Court, and that those
appointed serve 9-year terms -and a third of them are renewed every three years-. In
these circumstances, those in the leadership of the political parties control the Parliament
and the Constitutional Court. In contrast, magistrates of the Supreme Court cannot be
removed from their posts, and the political filter is activated only when they are
appointed through a decisive intervention on the part of the General Council of the
Judiciary, the governing body of the judiciary (art. 122 CE), whose composition, in turn,
depends mainly on Parliament (cf. arts. 107 y ss. LOPJ).
In accordance with a highly simplified version of the theory in question, when the Supreme
Court is going to interpret a basic law or statute (art. 81 CE), and, in so doing, adopt a
particular decision, it will take into account the possible reactions of:
i) The Spanish Parliament, which can modify the law in question in view of
the ruling that interprets it.
ii) The Constitutional Court, which can annul the ruling.
The Supreme Court will not adopt a decision that is far removed from the political
preferences of the political group situated in the central (median) point of the
parliamentary range of positions: this would produce a majority reaction against the
decision, which would in turn lead to the passage of a modification to the law.
Neither will the Court adopt a position far removed from the interpretive preferences of
the median magistrate of the Constitutional Court, that is, the one who has as many
magistrates to his left as to his right or vice versa (with twelve magistrates, there is no
median magistrate in the strict sense). Such a position would lead to the Constitutional
Court annulling the ruling of the Supreme Court.
The conflict between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court shows the
tension between cooperation and personal interest. The existence of two Supreme
Courts creates a situation similar to that which exists when two economic agents share
the market for a product. This situation, referred to as a duopoly in economic terms, has
a point of equilibrium that bears the name of the American mathematician who
formally stated it for the first time: John F. Nash (1928-). A Nash equilibrium is a set of
choices in which the choice of each of the agents is optimal given the choice of the
others. A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which the interacting economic agents each
InDret 03/2001                            Pablo Salvador, Sonia Ramos, Álvaro Luna, Carlos Gómez
15
choose their best strategy in the context of the strategies that the other agents have
adopted. The result is a more efficient allocation of resources than in a monopoly, but
one that is less efficient than would occur in a free market (Gregory N. MANKIW, 1999,
p. 318 and Hal R. VARIAN, 1997, p. 559).
The set of possible interpretations will be situated between the sets of preference of the
bodies that can modify the content of the norm being interpreted. In the short term, the
Constitutional Court has more influence over the Supreme Court than Parliament does: to
pass an ordinary law, in principle, all that is required is the votes of half plus one of the
members of the Chamber of Deputies (lower chamber of the Spanish Parliament); to
change the Constitution, three fifths of the votes in each chamber are needed (art. 167 CE).
It is, moreover, easier to issue rulings than to modify laws.
See for example SSTS, 1st, 20.3.1991, concerning the invalidity of claims made clauses; 1st, 25.4.1991,
concerning witnesses in wills; and 1st, 4.5.1998, concerning the unconstitutionality of the
extrajudicial mortgage foreclosure. These rulings resulted in the passage of several reaction-laws
by Spanish parliamentarians: Law 30/1991 of 20 December, altering the civil code with regard to
wills, modified art. 685 CC; the Disposición Adicional Sexta Ley 30/1995, de ordenación y
supervisión de los seguros privados (concerning regulation and supervision of private insurance),
added a new paragraph to art. 73 Ley 50/1980, de 8 de octubre, del contrato de seguro
(concerning the law of insurance contracts); and the Disposición Final Novena de la LEC
modified art. 129 Ley Hipotecaria.
This model, which has simply been outlined here, implies the need for basic corrections,
which in our system would have to focus on the political parties, which play a key role in
parliament and in the voting behavior of members of both chambers. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this review, this question can be put aside for the moment and left to the
attention of political scientists.
Suffice it to say that in the Isabel Preysler cases, the real object of the conflict between the
two main Courts is not the scope of the right to personal and family privacy, or of the duty
of those working for her to maintain the confidentiality of certain matters: What is at stake
is the power to decide how laws are interpreted. From this perspective, it is reasonable to
predict that the points of view of the Constitutional Court (a Court of political guarantees,
whose members are appointed based on negotiation between the leadership of the various
parties controlling parliament) will tend to predominate over those of the Supreme Court:
the Constitutional Court will readily align itself with the legislative power (the majority of
whose members belong to parliamentary groups controlled by the parties). However, as
practically any case of appeal for protection (amparo) that reaches the Supreme Court,
trivial as it may be, can spark a new institutional conflict, this Court has an appreciable
capacity to interfere with the aims of the Constitutional Court. As a result, it is likely that in
the future the Constitutional Court will pursue a policy of self-restraint, limiting open
conflict to cases in which the outcome is politically important, and which cannot be
resolved by a simple modification to laws.
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A legislative policy that made it possible to reduce the number of cases of ordinary
protection (amparo)that can be subjected to cassation by the Supreme Court would also
make occasions of conflict less frequent (and, incidentally, reduce the power of the
Supreme Court). These results would have an even greater impact if accompanied by an
increase in the power of the Constitutional Court to reject appeals for constitutional or
extraordinary protection (amparo, currently, cf. arts. 41 y ss. LOTC). However, although a
reduction in the occasions of conflict may reduce their frequency, it does not eliminate the
causes of conflict: This would be achieved only if the number of Supreme Courts were odd
and less than three.
• Indret’s selection: 10 noteworthy cases
In the preceding pages, analysis has focused on the case of Isabel Preysler v. Hymsa and
others. In the next issue of InDret, as mentioned in the introduction, two other cases will be
analyzed: SSTS, 1st, 2.6.2000, Enrique Rodríguez Galindo v. Fermín Muguruza and others, and
8.3.1999, Children of Carlos Trías Bertran v. “Corporació Catalana de Radio i Televisió” and others.
From the remaining 110 cases on which rulings were made during the three-year period
1998-2000 by Spanish cassation, InDret has selected and will now outline 10 others, which,
in the view of the authors of this paper, merit inclusion in the first level of this
text.HIPERVÍNCULO
1. STS, 1st, 5.2.1998. Enrique Múgica v. Silex Media (publisher of the newspaper “Claro”)
and others
This ruling heads the list for more than one reason: First, it includes the highest
compensation for defamation that has been awarded by the Supreme Court to date
(300,506.05 €); and second, it raises the recurring question of where to strike the judicial
balance between the right to honor and the right to freedom of speech.
“Claro”, a Valencian newspaper, published a report with headlines that stated: “Valencian
judge sends case to Supreme Court. Múgica’s palms greased with forty-five million? And
ten for his lover?” and “Múgica and his beloved planned to share fifty-five million for
supporting the concession of a lottery in Valencia. A judge sends the case to the Supreme
Court”. Enrique Múgica Herzog, former Minister of Justice, sought compensation of
1,202,024,21 € and the publication of the ruling. The Supreme Court set aside the lower
Court rulings that had rejected the claim: the information, based on the statement in trial of
a drug trafficker, had been obtained through a violation of the sub judice rule, and could not
form the basis of any accusation against Enrique Múgica (F. D. 1st).
2. STS, 1st, 24.9.1999. Juan Miguel S. C. and Antonio R. L. v. "R., S.A." and Encarna
Sánchez
In a radio interview with Encarna Sánchez (30.3.1989), a military recruit claimed to have
been sodomized in the barracks showers by the plaintiffs (the colonel in charge of the
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regiment, and a captain). This accusation was later declared false by the Court. The
plaintiffs sought compensation of 450,759.07 € and 240,404.84 € for the colonel and the
captain respectively. The Provincial Court revoked the ruling made in the initial hearing
that had dismissed the case, and ordered the defendants to pay, jointly, 90,151.82 € to the
colonel and 60,101.21 € to the captain. The Supreme Court set aside the Provincial Court
ruling and set compensation at 60,101.21 € for each of the plaintiffs: Encarna Sánchez had
not taken the minimum care required (F. D. 1st).
Magistrates Antonio Gullón Ballesteros and Xavier O’Callaghan Muñoz issued a dissenting
opinion in which they set aside and annulled the ruling of the Provincial Court and confirmed the
ruling made in the initial hearing: accusations declared false subsequent to the interview are not
grounds for responsibility.
3. STS, 1st, 27.1.1998. Enrique-Ramón A. R. v. “Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión, SA”
and others
“Radio Melilla” (16.11.1990) had broadcast a false news item claiming that the plaintiff,
Enrique-Ramón A. R., a well-known businessman in Melilla, had been arrested in
possession of 25 kg of cocaine. The item was corrected almost two hours later. The plaintiff
sought compensation of 120,202.42 € and to have the ruling broadcast. In three instances,
the defendants were found liable and ordered to jointly pay the plaintiff 60,101.21 € and
broadcast the ruling.
Based on the same circumstances, Antonio V. A., the other individual implicated in trafficking in
cocaine sought compensation to be determined on the issuance of a ruling. As in the previous
case, the suit was allowed in three instances.
It is worth noting that all of those judging the case insisted that information published be
truthful, whereas that which led to the suit was clearly defamatory and easily checked (F.
D. 2nd). The minimal effect of the correction on the amount of compensation should also be
noted. Neither the lower Court rulings, nor that of the Supreme Court, make it possible to
evaluate the reasons justifying the precise amount awarded, apart from the clearly
defamatory nature of the information broadcast. It is to be hoped that the application of the
new LEC will reduce the frequency of cases in which the reader of case law cannot form a
sound idea of the seriousness of the harm done.
4. STS 15.11.1998. Joseph Emmanuel T., Abraham B. S. and others v. “Unidad Editorial,
S.A.” and Pedro J. R.
A case similar to those above, but which provoked more discussion in the Courts
themselves as a result of the contradictory decisions it led to, was that which was ruled on
in STS 15.11.1998. The newspaper “El Mundo del Siglo XXI” (24.6.1990) published a report
on “Who’s who in Spanish drug trafficking” under the headline “The drug men – The drug
route”, and under the heading “The money launderers”: “’Triay & Triay’, a Gibraltar law
firm, will be investigated in proceedings opened by Garzón”. “Triay & Triay” lawyers
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sought damages of 90,151.82 € and publication of the ruling. The initial ruling ordered the
defendants to jointly pay 60,101.21 € and publish the ruling. This decision was revoked by
the Provincial Court, then reinstated by the Supreme Court: the information had not been
properly obtained (F. D. 6th).
5. STS 23.4.1999 (A. 4248). Inmaculada S. G. v. “Mercantil Edicrónica, S.A.” and others
“La Crónica del Sur” and “El Caso Criminal”, two Spanish newspapers, along with various
“Cadena SER” radio programs, divulged that the plaintiff had been caught practicing a
sexual act during her wedding reception with a man who was not the one whom she had
just married. The plaintiff sought damages to be set in the initial ruling, and the publication
and broadcast of the ruling. The initial ruling and the Provincial Court found the
defendants jointly liable and ordered them to pay 66,111.33 €, as well as publishing and
broadcasting the ruling. The Supreme Court reduced compensation to 48,080.97 €.
The case is noteworthy in that it is unclear how the action by which the information was
obtained can be classified as an offence on the basis of art. 197 (concerning the discovery
and revelation of secrets), or corresponding sections of the criminal code. Nevertheless, it is
the view of the Supreme Court that illegitimate interference in the plaintiff’s privacy took
place, though it is questionable whether a wedding reception is an event that falls within
the sphere of personal and family privacy.
6. STS 16.2.1999 (A. 1243). Olegario S. C. v. Agustín V. F. and “La Región”
The newspaper “La Región” published statements made in the course of a press conference
by Agustín V. F., a senator. The statements said of the plaintiff: “I’ve accused him of
reaching an agreement with another judge to settle a matter concerning a private property
belonging to one of them and of a thousand other strange goings-on…” and “he’s usually
had a few by the afternoon, so he needs quite a bit of time to get things done”. The plaintiff
sought compensation of 360,607.26 € and the publication of the ruling. In three instances,
Agustín V. F. was ordered to pay 48,080.97 €. The comments offered by Agustín V. F. were
offensive and untruthful (F. D. 2nd).
The Supreme Court is very deferential with plaintiffs who are judges or magistrates. Along the
same lines, see SSTS 11.4.2000, 17.4.2000 and 5.7.2000 which resolve the suit brought by the
President of the High Court of Justice of Cantabria and his wife against various media
organizations. In all cases, the claimants partially achieved their objectives, obtaining a total of
78,131.57 €.
7. STS 31.12.1998 (A. 9771). Miguel Ángel P. B. v. “TISA” and others
The newspaper “La Vanguardia” (24.10.1991) published a report on sexual harassment of
women in the workplace. In the report, it was stated that the plaintiff, Court Clerk in the
Court where Mª Ángeles P. was employed, had sexually harassed her. The plaintiff sought
damages of 150,253.02 € and the publication of the ruling. In the three instances, the three
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defendants were found liable and ordered to jointly pay 15,025.3 € and to publish the
ruling. The newspaper had attributed lascivious conduct to the plaintiff, which had
brought him into disrepute, and the information regarding Mª Ángeles P. was neither of
general interest nor true (F. D. 6th and 7th).
The ruling presupposes that it is the reporter who is responsible for demonstrating the
truth of the information published. It should be stressed, however, that the Supreme Court
is very flexible in the application of this case law.
8. STS 15.12.1998 (A. 9638). Samuel Adaramewa A. and Daniel A. G. v. “Unidad Editorial,
S.A.” and others
“El Mundo Magazine” (3 and 4.8.1991) published a report about illegal immigration that
included a photograph of two Spanish citizens legally engaged in commercial activity in a
street market. The caption of this photograph stated: “Two African ‘illegals’ set up their
stall in the Madrid Flea Market”. The two men who appeared in the photograph sought
compensation of 30,050.61 € and publication of the ruling. In the three instances, the
claimants were awarded compensation of 15,025.3 €: The caption for the photograph was
untrue (F. D. 1st).
The classic case of the inaccurate caption has been examined in a paper published by InDret (see in InDret,
Pies de foto).
9. STS 21.2.2000 (A. 751). Nuria Patricia C. C. v. "Cantábrico de Prensa, SA" and others
The regional newspaper “Alerta” (6.10.1990) published information that the plaintiff had
been raped and that she was a virgin at the time of the assault. The report included a
photograph of the scene of the crime. The plaintiff sought damages of 150,253.02 €, the
publication of the ruling, and an order banning defendants from publishing further
information about her private affairs. The initial ruling found the defendants jointly liable
and ordered them to pay 36,060.73 €. The director of “Alerta” was ordered to publish the
ruling. The Provincial Court absolved the photographer and reduced compensation to
9,015.18 €. The Supreme Court reinstated the compensation awarded in the initial ruling:
the publication of the identity of the victim and the fact that she was a virgin was not
information of general interest (F. D. 6th).
10. STS 25.10.1999 (A. 7622). Gaudencio Inocencio L .P. v. “E., S.A.”, Santiago B. B. and
Ángela M. A.
The regional newspaper “Diario de Las Palmas” (18.3.1992) published news of a double
murder, including extracts from a police report that ruled out the plaintiff as a suspect and
indicated that he had a criminal record for an offence of sexual assault (rape) committed 12
years earlier. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and annulled the initial rulings
denying the claim: The defendants were found jointly liable and ordered to pay 6,010.12 €
and publish the ruling.
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It is not clear that there is illegitimate interference in the privacy of the plaintiff. The
information is defamatory but true, and, despite this, it is regarded as illegitimate
interference: bear in mind that LO 1/1982 does not expressly restrict defamation to
circumstances involving the divulgation of false and prejudicial information presented as
fact. This is a point where LO 1/1982 and other legal guidelines differ (art. 7.7 LO 1/1982).
Well-established Constitutional Court case law protects the right to disseminate true
information if it is of general interest. The ruling of the Supreme Court implies that the
facts of this suit lacked any such interest. The information was, in any case, irrelevant for
readers, as the plaintiff had been ruled out as a suspect.
Recently the question of the public and even official dissemination of information regarding the
criminal records of sex offenders has been the subject of a Ley autonómica (regional law) (Ley 5/2001,
Castilla la Mancha, de 17 de mayo, de Prevención de malos tratos y de protección a las mujeres
maltratadas – for the prevention of abuse and the protection of abused women).
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